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ABSTRACT
Determinants and Implications of Audit Reporting Lags in China
by
LUO Wei
Master of Philosophy in Accounting

Timeliness is an essential attribute of corporate financial reporting as it
affects the usefulness of information made available to external
investors. The recognition that the length of audit is the single most
important determinant influencing the timeliness of earnings
announcements has motivated investigations on audit reporting lags in
different countries. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research on this issue
in China where the institutional environment for accounting and
auditing practices is different from that of other countries. The growing
interest in the Chinese stock market from domestic and international
investors further increases the importance of this research. In this study,
I first explore the determinants of audit reporting lags in China based on
the characteristics of the Chinese audit market and business
environment. I then examine the implications of long audit reporting
lags. The findings of this paper indicate that audit risk, audit complexity,
and auditor expertise are all associated with the length of audit
reporting lags in China. Firms with long audit reporting lags are more
likely to have adverse consequences such as non-standard opinions and
financial statement restatements in subsequent periods.
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DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AUDIT REPORTING
LAGS IN CHINA

Chapter 1 Introduction

Timeliness as one of the most important qualitative characteristics of
accounting information requires that reliable information be made available to
financial statement users when they need it. A lack of timeliness can lead to a
loss of relevance and usefulness of financial information (FASB, 1980). This
issue has received increasing attention from regulatory authorities and
accounting researchers. Considering that a lengthy delay in the release of audited
financial statements makes the information less valuable to investors, the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced phased reductions in
reporting time limits from 90 days after the financial year end to 60 days (SEC,
2002b). In China, listed companies are required to issue their audited annual
reports to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the related
stock exchanges within 4 months after the financial year-end. The importance of
timeliness has been recognized by many studies. For example, timeliness could
have an impact on market value. Focusing on the US market, Beaver (1968)
indicates that investors postpone their purchases and sales of the security until
the earnings report is released. Interestingly, timeliness of the release of audit
report can also have an impact on the accuracy of accounting information.
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Bronson et al. (2011) suggest that lengthy audit lag reduces the reliability of
preliminary earnings releases: a 20 day delay in the audit report date increases
the probability of a PEA (preliminary earnings announcement) revision that
indicates a decrease in earnings reliability by one percentage point. However, the
requirement that annual financial statements be subjected to external audit can
conflict with timely reporting because the timeliness of financial reporting
depends on the length of the audit. It is thus important to explore the
determinants of audit reporting lag and its implications. Most previous studies
were conducted in the settings of developed countries or jurisdictions, such as
the U.S. (Bronson et al., 2011; Kinney and McDaniel, 1993; Krishnan and Yang,
2009), Australia (Davis and Whittred, 1980), and Hong Kong (Ng and Tai, 1994).
A related study by Haw et al. (2003) examines the effect of audit opinion and
earnings surprise on the timeliness of earnings announcements in China from
1995 to 1999. However, they did not investigate the consequences of late
announcements. I examine a broader set of determinants on audit reporting lag
as well as the consequences of long audit report lag in subsequent periods, based
on a more recent data set with an improved audit environment in China.

There are several reasons for conducting this study in the context of China.
First, the institutional environment of accounting and auditing practices in China
is different from that of developed countries. For example, most listed firms are
audited by Big 4 auditors in the developed markets. In recent years, the market
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share of Big 4 has been well over 90% across the world’s G8 economies (Grant
Thornton, 2007). In the domestic Chinese markets, however, Big 4 auditors audit
a much smaller portion of listed firms (around 40% of the market in terms of
revenue and 7% in terms of number of listed clients) (CICPA, 2010). Therefore,
in contrast to prior studies which focus on Big 4 auditors, this study focuses on
small and medium size audit firms whose audit lag could be affected by factors
different from those of large audit firms. Furthermore, my sample data indicate
that the standard deviation of audit reporting lags for firms that are audited by
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are 19 days and 25 days, respectively. The larger
variation in audit lags for non-Big 4 auditors suggests more importance in
studying the determinants and implication of long audit reporting lag. Second,
there is a unique advantage of conducting this research in the context of China.
The fact that all Chinese companies have the same financial year end (December
31) helps eliminate the confounding factor of having different year-ends for
different companies in the study of audit report lag. For example, companies
with year-end during the busy season for auditing may experience longer audit
delay because of human resource constraints and scheduling problems in audit
firms. Previous studies have documented both positive (Davis and Whittred,
1980) and negative (Ashton, et al., 1987) relationships between audit delay and
whether the company’s year-end date is in the audit busy season. In addition,
when the audit is conducted at about the same time as the tax reporting, the audit
lag may be affected by tax works. These confounding factors of having different
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year-end and tax reporting season on audit reporting lag are eliminated in the
context of China because of the uniform year-end for financial and tax reportings
for Chinese listed companies.

Third, most prior studies focus on examining the impact of company
characteristics such as company size, industry classification, and corporate
governance characteristics on audit report lag. This study, however, examines a
comprehensive set of audit related characteristics.

The improvements of the

institutional environment in China lead the auditors to attach more importance to
enhance audit quality (Chen et al., 2010). It is then interesting to see, after an
overall improvement in audit quality, whether specific audit characteristics
including audit risk, audit complexity, and auditor expertise play significant roles
in influencing audit reporting lag. Furthermore, as far as can be determined, no
published research has examined the adverse consequences of long audit report
lag on accounting and audit reportings in subsequent years.

Lastly, the still rapid growth of the Chinese economy means that a growing
body of domestic and international investors is interested in receiving timely and
reliable financial information. China is now the second largest economy in terms
of nominal GDP (Washington, 2010). The findings of this study should assist
investors and regulatory authorities in obtaining a clearer understanding of
factors that influence the timeliness of financial information in China.

4

During the audit process, the auditor and the client are continuously
involved in negotiations on the treatment of various accounting issues.
Extremely long audit lags often imply prolonged negotiations to settle
significant disagreements between the two parties. According to the
client-auditor negotiation literature, negotiations often result in less conservative
reporting as auditors make compromises (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991; Gibbins et
al., 2001). As a consequence, the problems in the accounts may not be
eliminated after negotiation. Adverse future consequences are likely to appear
when the existing problems are re-discovered in later years. In this study, I
examine two future outcomes related to accounting and audit reportings for
firms with long audit lags. The first is the receipt of non-standard audit opinion.
When the problems in financial statements resurface in the future, auditors may
have to issue non-standard opinions. Another future consequence is financial
statement restatements. As suggested by Palmrose and Scholz (2004),
restatement of financial statements is one of the most visible indicators of
improper accounting. I examine if these future adverse events are associated
with long audit reporting lag.

Specifically, I first develop an audit reporting model which examines the
association between audit characteristics and audit reporting lags for listed
companies in China. Then, I develop two models to assess the consequences of
prolonged audit lags. I find that longer audit reporting lags are significantly
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associated with a higher level of audit risk, audit complexity and a lower level of
auditor expertise. I also find that prolonged audit lags are significantly
associated with more non-standard audit opinions and restatements of financial
reports.

The findings about the determinants of audit lags help auditors understand
the determinants of audit delay so as to assess how the auditing process could be
improved. The implications of prolonged audit lag help management and
investors better understand and prepare for the adverse consequences.
Regulatory bodies may also find the study results helpful in assessing auditing
regulation governing the release of financial statements.

Chapter 2 Institutional Background

2.1 The Financial Reporting Environment in China
2.1.1 Audit reporting regulation
In China, there are several reporting regulations relevant to the audit report
date. The 1995 Specific Independent Audit Guidelines (No.7, article 19) defines
audit date as “the date when the CPA completes the fieldwork for the audit. The
date of the audit report should not generally be earlier than the date when the
entity’s management confirms and signs the financial statements” (CICPA,
1995). In the 2003 Specific Independent Auditing Standard No. 7 (revised),

6

article 15 states that the audit date is “the date when the CPA completes audit
work. The date of the audit report should not be earlier than the date when the
audited entity’s management signs the accounting reports” (CICPA, 2003). In the
Auditing Standards for the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants
issued in 2007, regulation No. 1501 specifies that “The audit report should
indicate the date of the report. This date should not be earlier than the date when
the Certified Public Accountant obtains sufficient and appropriate audit evidence
(including management’s acknowledgement of its responsibility for the financial
statements and the evidence of its approval of the financial statements) and
determines the audit opinion on the financial statements based on such evidence”
(CICPA, 2007). In practice, CPAs usually hand in the draft audit report and the
draft audited financial statements to management before signing the audit report
formally. If management approves and signs the audited financial statements, the
auditor will then sign the audit report.

As to the length of the audit reporting lag, Article 66 of the Securities Law
of the People's Republic of China (2005 Revision) specifies that “A listed
company whose shares or bonds have been listed for trading shall, within four
months as of the end of each accounting year, submit to the securities regulatory
authority under the State Council and the stock exchange an annual report”
(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2005). The annual
reports must be audited. Depending on the company and auditor situation, the
audit lag could be a few weeks, but some large companies with complex
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problems may need more time to obtain relevant information and submit the
annual report in late April. However, if companies cannot submit annual reports
before the deadline, they will face a variety of negative consequences. First, they
will need to make relevant disclosures about the reasons for the delay and pay
penalties. According to Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on the Shanghai
and Shenzhen Exchanges, “any listed company unable to disclose its periodic
reports within the specified time limit shall, in a timely manner, report to the
Exchange and make public the reasons thereof, its solution plan and the deadline
for a delayed disclosure” (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2008; Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, 2008). According to Article 193 of the Securities Law of the People's
Republic of China, “Where an issuer, a listed company or any other obligor of
information disclosure fails to disclose information according to the relevant
provisions (including late submission of annual reports) or where there is any
false record, misleading or major omission in the information it has disclosed, it
shall be ordered to correct, given a warning and imposed a fine up to 600,000
yuan. The person in charge and any other person as held to be directly
responsible shall be given a warning and be imposed a fine up to 300,000 yuan”
(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2005). Second, the
shares of the company can be suspended for trading by relevant stock exchange
until the annual report is released. Finally, given the importance of earnings
announcements to investors and companies, a late filing of annual report can
cause adverse market effects. According to Bartov et al. (2011), capital markets
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react negatively when a company files a late annual report. Chinese investors
also use the timing pattern of annual report releases to predict future earnings as
it has been demonstrated that firm performance is associated with the timing of
annual report releases in China: good news firms release their annual reports
earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest
(Haw et al. 2000).

2.1.2 Financial Statement Restatement and Audit Opinion
The restatement regulations in China have become more stringent over the
years. The first restatement standard is the 1999 Standard of Changes in
Accounting Policies and Estimates, and Corrections of Material Accounting
Errors. Section 3 of the standard gives a description of the restatement methods
and requires the disclosure of restatement amount and reasons in the footnotes of
the financial statements (Ministry of Finance, 1999). In 2003, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission issued Rules on Information Disclosure for
Listed Companies No.19 - The Correction of Financial Information and its
Disclosure. This regulation requires that listed companies use Provisional
Announcement of Significant Matters to report restated financial information
(CSRC, 2003). In 2006, Accounting Standards of Business Enterprises, Changes
in Accounting Policies and Estimates, and Corrections of Accounting Errors
requires that a restatement revises all the affected line items in the financial
statements for all relevant periods (Ministry of Finance, 2006). According to
Wong and Wu (2011), the reasons for Chinese firms to issue restatements can be
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classified into 8 categories: mistakes from subsidiaries, tax miscalculation,
misstatement of costs and expenses, misstatement of depreciation and provisions,
revenue recognition problems, subsidiaries revenue and book-tax conforming
adjustments, and other mistakes and misclassiﬁcations. There could be many
potential negative consequences of financial statement restatements such as
damage to corporate image, reduced confidence by investors on published
financial statements, and a drop in credit rating. Wei et al. (2009) find that
market reactions to restatement announcements are negative in China. The types
of announcement that generate significant negative market reactions include
announcements that are caused by serious accounting problems or are related to
core accounting indicators, and announcements that significantly reduce
earnings or show important bad news1.

There are 5 categories of audit opinion in China: standard unqualified
opinion, unqualified opinion with explanatory notes, qualified opinion, adverse
opinion, and disclaimer of opinion. In this study, non-standard audit opinions
include all audit opinions except for unqualified opinions. If a listed company
receives a non-standard opinion, the company could suffer negative regulatory
and economic consequences. First, according to Compilation Rules for
Information Disclosures by Companies That Offer Securities to the Public No.14，
Audit Opinions That Are Not Standard and Unqualified and the Handling of
1

Announcements that are caused by serious accounting problems refer to the
supplements or corrections for issues relevant to major accounting policies and
changes in accounting estimates that could affect audit opinion.
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Relevant Matters，“where the company has obviously violated the accounting
standards, rules or relevant information disclosure requirements and such
violation would, if not rectified, cause the registered accountant to issue an audit
opinion that is not standard and unqualified, the registered accountant shall point
that out and request the company to make necessary adjustments (Article 6). If
the company refuses to do so or if the adjustment is not adequate and the
accountant consequently issues an audit opinion that is not standard and
unqualified, the stock exchange may suspend trading of the shares of the
company (Article 7). During the suspension, the relevant matters will be
investigated and dealt with by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(Article 8)” (CSRC, 2001). Furthermore, it has been found that investors do
value audit opinions (Fargher and Wilkins, 1998; Soltani, 2000). According to
Chen et al. (2000), the stock market reacts negatively to non-standard opinions
in China.

2.2 The Audit Environment in China
2.2.1 The Development of Auditing Standards in China
In the 1990s, there were some voluntary auditing standards issued by the
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Chinese
Association of Certified Public Auditors (CACPA). However, a series of
financial frauds necessitated the need to monitor auditors more closely and to
better achieve international harmonization. Therefore, the China Independent
Auditing Standards Commission (CIASC) was formed in 1994. In 1995, the first
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batch of China’s Independent Auditing Standards (CIASs) was issued to improve
the quality and credibility of auditing in China. According to Lin and Chan
(2000), Chinese auditing standards are similar to international standards and
guidelines in many respects because the emerging Chinese accounting
profession adopted the well-established international standards and guidelines
with little change. The CIASs are legally binding on all certified public
accountants who conduct audit to give an opinion on the financial statements
prepared by management (Cooper et al. 2002).

2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market
China’s audit firms were affiliated with the government before 1998. This
affiliation often resulted in a lack of independence and regional protectionism.
Realizing the importance of establishing an independent audit profession, the
Ministry of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued
regulations to disaffiliate audit firms from government agencies by 1998. After
this disaffiliation reform, while there are improvements, the personnel of audit
firms still have close relationship with local governments. Audit quality and
independence continue to be influenced by government. (Chan et al., 2006) In
addition, the intense competition of China’s audit market gives clients more
bargaining power while imposing more business pressure on auditors. According
to Chen et al. (2010), at the end of 2006 73 audit ﬁrms in China were eligible to
audit about 1400 listed companies. In other words, one qualiﬁed ﬁrm had less
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than 20 listed customers to audit. A series of scandals involving earnings
manipulation and fraudulent financial reporting were exposed around 2001. This
led to a series of regulatory improvements to protect investors. As a result,
litigation and sanction risks faced by Chinese auditors have risen significantly.
According to Chen et al. (2010), auditors were less likely to compromise quality
for economic benefits from important clients in the post-2001 period as the
institutional environment became more protective for investors.

Lastly, the Chinese audit market is different from audit markets in the
developed countries as it is not dominated by the Big 4 auditors. According to
the ranking of accounting firms disclosed by the CICPA (2010), the market share
of Big 4 auditors in China is only 44.3% when measured by total revenue and
43.9% when measured by audit income in 2009.

Chapter 3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

3.1 Audit Characteristics and Audit Reporting Lag
Facing higher audit risks, auditors might increase the number of audit
procedures and devote more time in discussions and negotiations with their
clients. As a result, the length of the audit reporting lag will be increased. Chan
et al. (2012) found that the adopters of clawback (or compensation recovery)
provisions, which lead to lower audit risk, experience shorter audit lags. Low
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profitability or losses are signals of problems in the operation of a company, and
they could increase the likelihood of financial failure or management fraud. As a
consequence, audit risk is increased. Courtis (1976) found that profitability
significantly explains the difference between slow and fast reporters. Ashton et
al. (1989) found longer delays for companies reporting net losses. Bamber et al.
(1993) found that companies in financial distress tend to have longer audit
reporting lags. In this paper, leverage is also viewed as an indicator of a firm’s
financial stability and could be positively related to audit risks. A high total debt
to total asset ratio could increase the risk of financial failure of a company and
auditors tend to spend more time evaluating the operation of such a company.
However, it could also be argued that high leverage attracts more attention and
monitoring from creditors and should be associated with less audit risk. Altman’s
Z score, a measure of bankruptcy risk, is also included as an indicator of audit
risk. Finally, whether the audited company has pending litigation can have an
impact on the risk of the audit. I consider the existence of contingent liabilities
an indicator of such risk. The above discussion leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: Companies with a higher level of audit risk have longer audit lags than
companies with a lower level of audit risk.

Audit complexity can be another determinant of the length of audit lags. If
the business of the audited entity is very complex, it can take the auditors more
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time to collect and process information. Leventis et al. (2005) found that audit
reporting lag is positively associated with the existence of extraordinary items
which increases audit complexity. Ng and Tai (1994) used the number of
principal subsidiary companies held by a company to represent complexity and
diversification of business operation, and they found that complexity is
positively related to audit reporting lag. In this study, it is expected that a higher
audit fee is associated with a more complex audit because audit fee is an
indicator of the time and effort devoted to the audit, and it should be positively
related to a company’s level of business complexity (Hanlon et al., 2012). The
issuance of a non-standard opinion also increases audit complexity. According to
Whittred (1980), auditors might try to avoid issuing a non-standard opinion by
increasing the number of audit procedures to reduce any uncertainty or
disagreement. Management might also try to avoid a non-standard opinion by
discussing and negotiating with the auditors more frequently or in greater depth.
Either way, audit complexity is increased. The above discussion leads to the
second hypothesis:

H2: Companies with a higher level of audit complexity have longer audit delays
than companies with a lower level of audit complexity.

As for the association between auditor expertise and audit reporting lag,
large auditors such as the Big 4 auditors are expected to have more efficient
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audit planning, better human resources and more experience in auditing and thus
represent higher audit expertise. According to Ashton et al. (1989), large auditors
finish the audit quicker because of their expertise. In addition, auditor expertise
can be related to the auditor’s experience with a company. A change in auditor
could imply lower auditor expertise as a new auditor has less experience in
auditing the company and is less knowledgeable about the company’s operation
and accounting procedures. According to Tanyi et al. (2010), audit report lags
change after either voluntary or involuntary auditor switches. According to Ng
and Tai (1994), the length of audit lag is positively associated with a change in
auditor probably because the newly appointed audit firm needs time to
familiarize itself with the company and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
of the internal control system.

The above discussion leads to the third

hypothesis:

H3: Auditors with more expertise have shorter audit lags than auditors with less
expertise.

3.2 Audit Reporting Lag and Adverse Outcomes
Long audit reporting lags imply intense negotiation between the managers
and the auditors to resolve their disagreements. According to Antle and Nalebuff
(1991), an auditor’s initial offer in the negotiation can be conservative. However,
if management feel that they know better about the state of the company’s
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financial condition, they may protest or try to change the adjustments made by
the auditor that result in understatements of income, while remaining silent on
adjustments that cause overstatements of income. As a consequence, only
income increasing adjustments are left unopposed. Utilizing an analytical model,
Antle and Nalebuff (1991) demonstrate that as auditing contracts are designed to
maximize joint auditor-client surplus, the expected ex post bias is always upward.
In other words, after negotiation, the auditors tend to be less conservative and
the result is more aggressive financial reporting. According to Gibbins et al.
(2001), management views the negotiation as a win-lose situation and intend to
persuade the auditors. Auditor’s acquiescence or compromise is often expected.
As problems in the financial statements often continue to exist after the
negotiation, there will likely be adverse consequences when these problems
resurface in the future. Non-standard audit opinions and financial statement
restatements are used as indicators of adverse future consequences in this study.
The above discussion leads to the fourth and fifth hypotheses:

H4: Companies with long audit reporting lags are more likely to receive
non-standard audit opinions in subsequent years than companies with short audit
reporting lags.

H5: Companies with long audit reporting lags are more likely to have financial
statement restatements in subsequent years than companies with short audit
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reporting lags.

Chapter 4 Research Methodology

Three regression models are developed. The first model examines the
determinants of audit reporting lags. The second and third models examine the
relationship between long audit reporting lags and two future adverse
consequences. The first model is specified as follows:

Auditlagt = α0 + α1 Audit_riskt + α2Audit_complexityt + α3 Audit_expertiset +
∑αjControl variablest +ε

(1)

where Audit_risk is measured by (1) Assetreturn: the ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes to total assets; (2) Loss: an indicator variable if net income is
less than zero; (3) Leverage: the ratio of total debt to total assets; and (4) Zscore:
Altman’s Z-score: a measure of bankruptcy risk2; (5) Contingent_liability: an
indicator variable if a company has contingent liability. Auditor_complexity is
measured by (1) Audit_fee: the natural logarithm of total audit fee; and (2)
Opinion: an indicator variable if the company does not receive a standard
opinion. Audit_expertise is measured by (1) Auditor: an indicator variable if the
2

Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5, where X1 is working
capital (current assets less current liabilities) to total assets, X2 is retained
earnings divided by total assets, X3 is earnings before interest and taxes divided
by total assets, X4 is market value of equity divided by total liabilities, and X5 is
total operating revenue divided by total assets
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auditor of a company is not a Big 4 auditor; and (2) Change: An indicator
variable when there is a switch of the company’s external auditor.

Following previous research, six categories of control variables known to
influence audit reporting lag are included:

(1) Corporate Governance
Several studies explored the relationship between audit delay and corporate
governance characteristics. For example, Mohamad, et al. (2010) examined
whether characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee are
related to the timeliness of audit reporting, and find that audit committee size and
the number of audit committee meetings are negatively associated with audit
reporting lag, while the proportion of independent directors on the board has a
positive relationship with audit lag.

In the context of China, the importance of board independence has been
emphasized. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) released the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the
Board of Directors of Listed Companies (CSRC, 2001). According to the
Guideline, by June 30th, 2002, at least two members of the board of directors
shall be independent directors. At least one third of board shall be independent
directors by June 30th, 2003. In this study, the percentage of independent
directors on the board, the number of board meetings, and the ownership
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concentration are included to control for the impact of corporate governance on
audit lag. It is expected that a more independent board that has more frequent
board meetings will oversee the financial reporting process more closely and
ensure a more timely submission of financial statements.

As to ownership concentration, Chinese companies are characterized by a
highly concentrated ownership structure which could have two effects on audit
reporting lags. On one hand, when the ownership entrenchment effect is
dominant, the controlling shareholders may have self serving behavior at the
expense of outside shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002) and tend to cover up such
behavior by withholding unfavorable information or deferring the release of
financial reports. As a result, under the entrenchment perspective, the audit
reporting lag should be longer for firms with a high level of ownership
concentration. On the other hand, if the incentive alignment effect is dominant,
controlling shareholders might be encouraged to facilitate the release of financial
information to benefit minority shareholders. For example, Gomes (2000)
indicates that high concentration may lead to the controlling shareholders’
commitment toward a reputation of not expropriating minority shareholders.
Therefore, under the incentive alignment perspective, the audit reporting lag
should be shorter for firms with a high level of ownership concentration.
(2) Earnings Surprise
Previous studies have shown that the timing of a company’s earnings
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announcements is related to whether the earnings convey good news or bad
news (Givoly and Palmon, 1982). Generally, a company tends to be more willing
to disclose earnings announcement early when the earnings convey good news
and contain large positive earnings surprise. In this study, I include Goodnews
(an indicator variable if net income is not smaller than forecast net income) and
Surprise (the difference between actual earnings per share and forecast earnings
per share) to control for the impact of earnings surprise on audit reporting lag.

(3) Information Demands
It is anticipated that larger companies attract more attention from the public
and have more pressure to issue financial reports in a timely fashion so that they
can meet the information demands of investors, trade unions and regulatory
agencies. The negative relationship between corporate size and audit reporting
lag has been documented by previous studies (Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; Ng
and Tai, 1994). Therefore, company size is included as a control variable in the
model. Furthermore, if a firm is concurrently listed on more than one stock
exchange, its financial information will be followed by more investors and this
may pressure the firms and the auditors into issuing financial statements earlier.
On the other hand, as the financial information is used by more investors, the
auditor may want to be more cautious because of increased litigation risks. It is,
therefore, an empirical issue as to how the listings on more than one stock
exchange could influence audit lag. I include an indicator variable if the shares
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of a firm are traded simultaneously on more than one stock exchange to capture
this effect.

(4) Earnings Quality
Companies with low earnings quality are expected to be less willing to
disclose their financial information on time. Krishnan and Yang (2009) found
evidence that companies with high audit lags had slightly higher levels of
absolute discretionary accruals which suggests lower earnings quality. In this
study, an indicator variable is included for companies issuing restatements to
control for the influence of earnings quality, as restatements are usually
associated with misreporting of financial statements (Rezaee, 2002). In this study,
I also consider the influence of regulatory pressure on earnings quality. In China,
companies in the finance and public utilities industries are subject to more
regulatory pressure. For example, the financial industry is monitored by the
China Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory
Commission, China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the People’s Bank of
China. The public utilities industry is regulated by institutions such as State
Electricity Regulatory Commission. Since these industries are more closely and
strictly supervised by authorities, their earnings quality could be higher. Their
management may want to have their audit reports issued sooner. On the other
hand, as the regulatory bodies have more specific regulations and requirements
regarding the audit and financial reporting of companies in such industries, it
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may take the auditors more time to complete the audit in accordance with the
regulations. More regulations could also cause more earnings manipulations
when regulations are based on accounting numbers and thus result in longer
reporting lags. An indicator variable is used if a company belongs to highly
regulated sectors to account for the impact of regulatory pressure on audit
reporting lag.

(5) Chinese Characteristics
Apart from variables that are found to be associated with audit delay in
previous studies, specific Chinese characteristics that may affect audit reporting
lags are included: A. Tradable Shares. One feature of listed companies in China
is that they have two types of shares: tradable shares and non-tradable shares. A
higher percentage of tradable shares indicate a greater number of investors who
rely on financial reports to make decisions. The auditor will face higher
litigation risk as the number of investors increase. This could result in more
workload and longer audit reporting lag. However, it could also be argued that a
larger number of external investors will increase the pressure on management to
shorten the audit reporting lag so that financial statements can be released more
timely. B. State Ownership. It is widely known that many Chinese firms are
state-owned or only partially privatized despite a series of economic reforms.
This characteristic could have an influence on audit reporting lag. On one hand,
the government as the largest owner could impose a high level of pressure on the
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firm to submit financial reports in a timely fashion. On the other hand, state
ownership may imply inefficiency in management as state-owned firms are often
used by government institutions for political purposes such as a means of
channeling benefits to supporters. An inefficient management team might be less
willing to disclose their problematic financial information to the public. I use an
indicator variable if the largest shareholder is the government to control for the
influence of state ownership on audit delay.

(6) Year and Industry Dummies
These variables are used to control for year and industry effects. I have six
year dummies and six industry dummies included in the regression models.

The other two hypotheses will be tested by the following models:
Opiniont=γ0 + γ1 Long_audit_lagt-1 +∑γjControl variables +ε

(2)

Restatementt =β0+ β1 Long_audit_lagt-1 ∑βjControl variables + ε

(3)

In the second model, Opiniont is an indicator variable which equals one if
the company receives a non-standard opinion in year t, and zero otherwise.
Long_Audit_lagt-1 is an indicator variable defined by: A. firms with the top 5%
longest audit lag (the number of days between the year-end and the date on
which an audit report is signed). B. firms with the top 10% longest audit lag. C.
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firms with the top 15% longest audit lag. The control variables are chosen
following previous studies on determinants of non-standard opinion: current year
audit opinion, profitability (measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to total assets), loss, revenue (measured by total operating revenue),
leverage, bankruptcy risk, company size, auditor (whether the auditor is a Big 4
auditor), cash flow (whether there is any negative operating cash flow), and
equity (whether there is any negative book value of equity) (Mutchler et al. 1997;
Reynolds and Francis, 2000).

In the third model, Restatementt is an indicator variable which equals 1 if a
company restates its financial statements in year t, and zero otherwise. The
independent variable is Long_Audit_lagt-1. Several important determinants of
restatement (in year t) are included in the model as control variables. First, I
control for current year restatements in year (t-1). I also control for operational
risk using the ratio of inventory to total assets. According to Kinney and
McDaniel (1989) and Defond and Jiambalvo (1991), the probability of
restatement is associated with profitability, earnings growth (measured by
growth rate of return on equity), loss, leverage, bankruptcy risk (measured by
Altman’s Z score), company size, opinion, and auditor. I also choose control
variables based on studies conducted in the Chinese context. According to Wei et
al. (2010), the location of the stock exchange and whether a Chinese company is
classified as ST (Special Treatment) firms are associated with restatements. ST
firms are companies receiving special treatment on the stock exchange because
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of financial difficulties. A list of variable definitions is given in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]

Chapter 5 Data Collection

The sample data consist of companies that issue A and B shares on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. I extract accounting data from the
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The sample
period covers a recent six-year period, 2004-2009. Audit reports were issued in
2010 on the 2009 financial statements. I started from 2004 because the CICPA
published the Guidance on the Practice Criteria for Certified Public Accountants
of China No.5 – Audit Report in 2003. This document gives detailed guidance
about audit dates. When a CPA decides the audit date, he or she should consider
the following factors: the audit procedures should have been completed; issues
that should be adjusted or published by the audited entity have been proposed
and the audited entity has agreed or refused to make the adjustments or
publications; the management of the audited entity has formally signed the
accounting statements (CICPA, 2003). This detailed guidance facilitates the
auditors’ determination the appropriate audit report date. In addition, among the
9153 firm year observations, around 4000 of them are dropped from the sample
due to the lack of analysts’ forecast data in measuring the earnings news
variables.

26

Chapter 6 Empirical Results

6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable:
audit reporting lag. The mean audit lag for all firm year observations is 87.06
days. This level of audit delay is longer than those reported in previous studies
for other countries. According to Ettredge et al. (2006), the mean audit delay for
the U.S. companies is 50 days in 2003 and 70 days in 2004. According to Ashton
et al. (1989), Canadian companies have a mean audit delay of 55 days. The
longer audit reporting lag in China may be explained by the relatively liberal
requirement of submitting annual reports within 120 days after the financial year
end while the USA and Canada have a stricter 90-day requirement.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As can be observed from the histogram in Figure 1, the mean audit lag for
year 2004 was the shortest: 84.82 days. It then rose to about 87 days in the
following two years. In 2007, the audit lag slightly decreased to 86.6 days. Year
2008 (audit report issued in 2009) experienced the longest audit lag: 89.52 days.
The 2008 financial crisis might account for this unprecedented audit delay. As
many companies suffered huge losses or had financial difficulties because of the
crisis, auditors had to devote more time investigating financial statements for
potential problems or the companies may want to postpone the release of bad
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news. In 2009 (audit report issued in 2010), the mean audit lag was reduced to
85.68 days.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Table 2 panel B presents the descriptive statistics for all the independent
variables. 14% companies experienced losses which might lead to longer audit
delay. The average leverage level for Chinese companies is 55% which is higher
than that of other countries: US firms have a leverage of 20% for family firms
and 24% for non-family firms (Chen et al., 2010); French firms have a leverage
of 23% (Aubert, F., 2009); Malaysian firms have a leverage of 44% (Yaacob,
N.M., 2012); New Zealand firms have a leverage of 46% (Carslaw and Kaplan,
1991). This is perhaps because of government control of Chinese companies.
About eighteen percent of companies had contingent liabilities that may increase
audit risk. Nine percent of listed companies received non-standard audit opinion.
Companies have about ten subsidiaries on average. Only 7% of listed companies
employed Big 4 auditors and this reveals a highly competitive audit market in
China. Also, 9% of companies switched their auditors during the sampling
period. The average percentage of tradable shares for Chinese companies is 53%.
In over 50% of the firms, the largest shareholder is state related. This reveals that
the Chinese government plays a significant role in controlling listed companies.
The average holding percentage of the largest shareholder is 38%. This reveals a
highly concentrated ownership structure in China. The average percentage of
independent directors is 36% which satisfies the 1/3 independent board members
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requirement. The board of directors has about 8 meetings per year and, on
average, about 45% companies have good news or receive higher earnings than
expected. These companies may be more willing to accelerate the release of
annual reports. On average, companies receive 8% lower earnings per share
(EPS) than forecast EPS. Finally, 11% of listed companies had restatements
which could result in long audit reporting lags.

Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all variables. First, audit lag is
significantly correlated with many of the experimental variables. For example,
audit lag is significantly negatively correlated with asset return and Zscore,
while significantly positively correlated with the existence of losses, leverage
level, the existence of contingent liabilities, the receipt of non-standard opinion
and audit fee. Audit lag is also significantly positively related to an auditor
change. It is interesting to observe that the audit lag is significantly negatively
related to a non-Big 4 auditor. This is not consistent with the expectation that a
non-Big 4 auditor with a lower level of audit expertise should have a longer
audit lag. However, as non-Big 4 auditors suffer less from reputation losses, they
may cut short their auditing process to save costs. In addition, the dependent
variable, audit lag, is significantly correlated to many control variables. For
example, audit lag is found to be significantly positively related to the
percentage of tradable shares. This result supports the proposition that there is a
higher litigation risk faced by the auditors of companies that have a larger
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number of tradable shares which in turn results in more workload and longer
audit reporting lag. State ownership is significantly negatively correlated with
audit lag. This result suggests that government as a controlling shareholder could
probably impose higher pressure on companies and ensure a timely submission
of financial reports. Audit lag is significantly negatively correlated with
ownership concentration suggesting that the alignment effect dominants the
entrenchment effect and large shareholders can impose more pressure on
companies to submit financial statements timely. Audit lag is significantly
negatively correlated with the number of board meetings, suggesting that better
corporate governance could promote timely reporting. It is found that audit lag is
significantly negatively related to good news and earnings surprise. This is
consistent with the expectation that companies tend to accelerate the auditing
process when there is positive information contained in the earnings
announcements. Finally, companies with concurrent listings on more than one
stock exchange are found to have significantly longer audit lag. The auditors
may increase the audit time for such companies because of higher litigation risk.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
6.2 Determinants of Audit Reporting Lag
Table 4 presents the multivariate regression result for the determinants of
audit reporting lag. The industry and year dummies are included in the model but
not tabulated. The result shows that asset return is significantly negatively
related to audit reporting lag. That is, a higher profitability which indicates a
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lower level of audit risk results in shorter audit delay. As expected, the existence
of contingent liabilities suggesting the possible existence of pending litigations
is significantly positively related to audit lag as such problems increase the audit
risk. Thus, the result supports the first hypothesis that companies with a higher
level of audit risk have longer audit lags than companies with a lower level of
audit risk. I also observe that the receipt of a non-standard opinion, audit fee and
number of subsidiaries which imply more audit complexity are all significantly
positively associated with audit lag. This result supports the second hypothesis
that companies with a higher level of audit complexity have longer audit delays
than companies with a lower level of audit complexity. Finally, auditor change
which indicates a lower level of audit expertise is significantly associated with
the length of audit lag with the expected positive sign, supporting the third
hypothesis.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Regarding the control variables, one of the corporate governance
characteristics – the number of board meetings - is found to be significantly
negatively related to audit lag. This is consistent with the expectation that stricter
corporate governance tends to ensure a more timely submission of financial
statements. It is also found that good_news is significantly negatively related to
the length of audit lag. This is consistent with the expectation that companies
tend to accelerate the release of good news. Firms with high regulatory pressures
have significantly shorter audit delay probably because the regulatory bodies
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supervise the financial reporting of such companies more strictly.
6.3 Consequences of Long Audit Reporting Lag
As mentioned earlier, two adverse consequences of long audit reporting lag
are examined in this study. Table 5 Panel A presents the findings for the
association between the receipt of non-standard opinion and long audit lag. In all
three models, I found that long audit lag is significantly positively related to the
receipt of non-standard audit opinion in the following year. In addition, most
control variables are also significantly related to the dependent variable with the
expected signs. For example, firms receiving non-standard opinions in the
previous year are more likely to receive non-standard opinions in the current
year. Firms with lower profitability, more losses, lower revenue, higher leverage,
and negative equity and cash flows are more likely to be issued a non-standard
opinion.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 5 Panel B presents the findings for the association between financial
statement restatement and long audit lag. It is found that restatement in the
subsequent year is significantly positively associated with long audit reporting
lag in the 5% definition option. However, in the 10% and 15% cases, the
associations are not significant possibly because some of the audit lags are not
abnormally long in these two cases. Interestingly, I found that companies listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are more likely to make restatements. This is
probably because companies listed on this exchange are larger companies that
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are subject to more scrutiny from auditors and the public.

To summarize, the empirical results support hypotheses four and five.
Companies should be alerted that a prolonged audit lag could be associated with
adverse consequences including the receipt of non-standard opinion and
financial statement restatement in the subsequent year.

Chapter 7 Sensitivity Tests

7.1 Exclude “ST” Firms
In March, 1998, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) started
a policy to give “special treatment” to firms with abnormal financial problems.

3

These firms are then called “ST” firms. This policy reminds the investors that
they need to pay special attention to default risk. Because of “ST” firms’
abnormal financial condition, some studies exclude such firms to reduce their
irregular influence on regression results. In this study, I re-examine the
determinants of audit lags in China after excluding “ST” firms.

As can be observed from Table 6 (Panel A) the regression results are not

3

ST firms are subject to the following “treatments”:
1. The company’s share and its derivatives will be designated as “ST”, and its
trading quotation is to be published in another board.
2. The daily quotation fluctuation for the company’s share is limited to 5%.
3. During the period of “special treatment”, the company’s middle-term report
must be audited (Bai, et al., 2002).
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significantly different from those in Table 4. Asset return and contingent liability
are significantly related to audit lag with expected signs suggesting that higher
audit risks are associated with longer audit lags. The receipt of non-standard
opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries are significantly positively related
to audit lags. This result supports that audit complexity is positively associated
with audit lags. It is also found a change in auditor is significantly positively
associated with audit lag at the 10% significance level. Therefore, all three
hypotheses are supported by the sensitivity test result.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
7.2 Drop of Earnings Surprise Variables
The lack of analysts’ forecast data reduces the sample size by about 4000
observations. Therefore, in the second sensitivity test, I drop the two earnings
surprise variables and re-examine the first model. The results shown in Table 6
(Panel B) are not significantly different from those in Table 4. Asset return is
significantly negatively related to audit lag while the existence of loss is
significantly positively related to audit lag. The first hypothesis is supported.
The receipt of non-standard audit opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries
are all significantly positively related to audit lag. This result indicates that
higher audit complexity is associated with longer audit lag. A change in auditor
is significantly positively related to audit lag, and the third hypothesis is
supported.
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7.3 Auditor Change (Alternative Definition)
In the third sensitivity test, I re-examine the determinants of audit lags in
China after adjusting the auditor change variable. Specifically, because switches
from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor may not indicate a decrease of audit
expertise, I exclude such cases from my analysis. The result shown in Table 6
(Panel C) is not significantly different from that of the original model in Table 4.
Asset return and the existence of contingent liabilities are significantly related to
audit lag with the expected signs, and the first hypothesis is supported. The
receipt of non-standard audit opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries are
all significantly positively related to audit lag as expected. Finally, the
significantly positive association between auditor change and audit lag supports
the third hypothesis.

7.4 Audit Opinion (Alternative Definition)
In a sensitivity test for Model 2, I classified the “unqualified opinion with
emphasis of matter paragraph” opinion as standard opinion instead of
non-standard opinion as in Table 5, (Panel A). As can be observed in Table 6
(Panel D), there is no change in the relationship between the experimental
variables and the dependent variable when the first definition option for long
audit lag is adopted. That is, firms with the top 5% longest audit lag are more
likely to receive non-standard opinions in the subsequent year even with this
re-classification of audit opinion.
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7.5 Non-standard Audit Opinion and Long_Audit_Lag (t-2)
In a sensitivity test for both models 2 and 3, I changed the test variable from
long_audit_lag (t-1) to long_audit_lag (t-2) to examine whether abnormally long
audit reporting lag would still result in the receipt of non-standard opinion or
financial statement restatement after two years. As can be observed from the
Table 6 (Panels E and F), the relationships between long_audit_lag (t-2) and the
receipt of non-standard opinion are significant in all three definitions of
long_audit_lag. However, I do not find significant relationships between
long_audit_lag (t-2) and restatement.

7.6 Restatements (Exclusion of trivial restatements)
In China, restatements could be triggered by trivial issues not affecting
accounting numbers in the financial statements. For example, disclosures of
clerical errors, supplementary information, explanatory information, and change
of accounting policy are all included in restatements. I re-define the restatement
variable in Model 3 by excluding less relevant restatements: in Table 6 (Panel G),
restatements about clerical errors are excluded, and the result shows that long
audit lag is significantly positively associated with restatements in the first
definition option, i.e. top 5% of audit lag. In Table 6 (Panel H), restatements that
correct for clerical errors, disclose explanatory, supplementary, and change of
accounting policy information are excluded. The result shows that long audit lag
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is also significantly positively related to restatement in the first definition option,
i.e. top 5% of audit lag.

Chapter 8 Conclusion and Implications

This paper examines the determinants of audit reporting lags in China and
the consequences of long audit reporting lags. Audit reporting lags are found to
be significantly associated with audit risk, audit complexity, and audit expertise.
Specifically, a higher level of audit risk and audit complexity and a lower level
of audit expertise are associated with longer audit delay. Since all Chinese listed
firms have the same financial year end, I am able to assess the determinants of
audit reporting lag without the confounding effects of differing balance sheet
dates. I also found that the more frequent issuance of non-standard opinion and
accounting restatements after a firm has a prolonged audit lag. Prolonged audit
delay implies intensive negotiations between auditors and the management.
Even though agreements may finally be reached between the auditor and the
management, potential problems in the financial statements are often detected in
subsequent years and can have adverse consequences.

There are two additional implications from this research. For management,
they should be more careful in examining the causes of prolonged audit delay in
an attempt to reduce or avoid adverse consequences. To the regulators, as 54%
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of the listed companies in China actually take not more than 3 months to
complete their financial statement audit, the 120-day requirement may be too
generous. Also, the 120-day requirement may unnecessarily reduce the
timeliness of the release of accounting information in China. For example,
companies may strategically delay the release of bad news for as long as
possible. Therefore, regulatory authorities may consider shortening the 120-day
requirement to be more compatible with international practice and to insure that
the published financial statements are timely and useful for investors.

I acknowledge several limitations in this study. First, there are many
different measures of audit risk, audit complexity, and audit expertise. While the
measures used in this study represent the more direct measures and they are
supported by prior literature, I do not include all possible measures. Some
measures used can by classified under either audit risk or complexity. Some
control variables also can affect audit risk and complexity. Nevertheless, even if
I re-classify some measures from audit risk to audit complexity (or vice versa) or
from control variables to experimental variables, my test results indicate that the
conclusions on the hypotheses will not change. Second, I did not examine the
capital market effect of long audit delay because this specific consequence was
studied in prior literature and I want to focus on the accounting and audit
reporting consequences that have not been examined in prior studies.
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Finally, while litigation is an important factor driving audit reporting lag in
the US, litigations for Chinese companies are not as widespread. Some Chinese
companies are reluctant to disclose such contingencies. I have included a
contingent liability variable to account for this effect. Limited disclosure by
Chinese companies on litigation precludes a more elaborated analysis on this
issue.
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
Variable
Definition
Asset_return
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets
Audit_fee
The natural logarithm of total audit fee
Auditor
An indicator variable if the auditor is a non-Big 4 auditor
An indicator variable if the operating cash flow is
Cash_flow
negative
Change
An indicator variable if the company's external auditor is
switched
Holding percentage of the largest shareholder
Concentration
An indicator variable if the company has any contingent
Contingent_liability
liability
An indicator variable if the book value of equity is
Equity
negative
An indicator variable if the shares of a firm are traded
Exchange
simultaneously on more than one stock exchange
An indicator variable if net income is not smaller than
Good_news
forecast net income
Growth_rate
Growth rate of return on equity
Ln_audit_lag
Natural logarithm of the number of days between client’s
fiscal year-end and the audit report date
Independent
The percentage of independent directors on the board
Inventory
The ratio of inventory to total assets
Leverage
The ratio of total debt to total assets
Location
An indicator variable if a firm is listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange
Long_audit_lag
An indicator variable for firms with the top 5%, 10%, and
15% longest audit lag
Loss
An indicator variable if net income is less than zero
Number of board meetings
Nmeeting
Nsubsidiaries
Number of subsidiaries
Opinion
An indicator variable if the company does not receive a
standard opinion
Regulatory_
An indicator variable if the company belongs to highly
Pressure
regulated sectors
Restatement
An indicator variable for companies announcing financial
statements restatements
Revenue
Natural logarithm of total operating revenue
STfirm
An indicator variable if a firm is classified as "ST" firm
The difference between actual earnings per share and
Surprise
forecast earnings per share
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Switch
Size
State_owned
Tshare
Zscore

An indicator variable when the company’s external
auditor is switched
The natural logarithm of total assets
An indicator variable if the largest shareholder is the
government
The percentage of tradable shares
Altman's Z score
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Dependent Variable
Overall Statistics
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag
accounting_year
audit_lag

Obs
8952

Mean
87.06

Std. Dev.
24.23

Min
0

Max
241

1351

84.82

26.09

9

223

1317

87.83

24.51

0

241

1448

87.87

24.49

10

119

1545

86.60

25.19

10

239

1591

89.52

21.18

13

126

1700

85.68

23.82

10

119

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel B. Independent Variables
Variable

Observations

Mean

asset_return
loss
leverage
zscore
contingent_liability
opinion
audit_fee
Nsubsidiaries
auditor
change
Tshare
state_owned
concentration
independent
Nmeeting
good_news
surprise
size
exchange
restatement
regulatory_pressure

8945
9015
8920
8949
8843
9152
7788
7794
9152
8649
8972
9010
9010
8889
9003
4699
5649
9013
8860
9153
9015

0.0465
0.1362
0.5476
1.7546
0.1773
0.0905
13.2027
10.6848
0.9301
0.0946
0.5288
0.5355
0.3775
0.3554
8.4752
0.4541
-0.0832
21.4079
0.0710
0.1112
0.0978
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Std.
Dev.
0.0988
0.3430
0.3585
2.3892
0.3820
0.2869
0.7809
13.5730
0.2550
0.2926
0.2171
0.4988
0.1608
0.0510
3.5237
0.4979
0.4205
1.3622
0.2570
0.3144
0.2971

Min

Max

-1.0210 0.4927
0
1
0.0510
5.5043
-26.9615 12.3027
0
1
0
1
10.3090 19.2405
1
223
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0.0082
1
0
0.7143
1
36
0
1
-22.48
1.54
10.8422 30.0979
0
1
0
1
0
1
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Table 4
Model 1 Determinants of Audit Reporting Lag
Independent Variables:

Audit
Risk

Audit
Complexity
Audit
Expertise
China
Variables
Corporate
Governance
Earnings
Surprise
Information
Demand
Earnings
Quality

intercept
asset_return
loss
leverage
zscore
contingent_liability
opinion
audit_fee
Nsubsidiaries
auditor
change
Tshare
state_owned
concentration
independent
Nmeeting
good_news
surprise
size
exchange
restatement
regulatory_pressure

Dependent
Variable:

Ln_audit_lag

Number of obs
F( 30, 2795)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared

2826
9.380
0.000
0.092
0.082
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Predicted
Sign
?
+
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
+
?

Coefficients P-value
3.888
-0.634
0.047
-0.100
0.000
0.041
0.156
0.046
0.001
0.030
0.049
-0.002
0.018
-0.017
-0.081
-0.009
-0.039
-0.008
0.004
0.029
-0.035
-1.459

0.000
0.000
0.154
0.079
0.966
0.036
0.001
0.007
0.004
0.370
0.045
0.965
0.237
0.738
0.557
0.000
0.007
0.754
0.664
0.406
0.117
0.000

*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
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Table 6
Sensitivity Tests
Panel A. Exclude ST Firms
Independent Variables:

Audit
Risk

Audit
Complexity
Audit
Expertise
China
Variables
Corporate
Governance
Earnings
Surprise
Information
Demand
Earnings
Quality
Dependent
Variable:
Number of obs
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared

intercept
asset_return
loss
leverage
zscore
contingent_liability
opinion
audit_fee
Nsubsidiaries
auditor
change
Tshare
state_owned
concentration
independent
Nmeeting
good_news
surprise
size
exchange
restatement
regulatory_pressure
Ln_audit_lag
2771
0.000
0.092
0.083
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Predicted
Sign
?
+
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
+
?

Coefficients P-value
3.867
-0.788
0.031
-0.085
0.003
0.042
0.163
0.047
0.001
0.030
0.043
0.011
0.021
0.000
-0.066
-0.009
-0.035
-0.020
0.003
0.027
-0.032
-0.001

0.000
0.000
0.351
0.164
0.730
0.031
0.002
0.005
0.007
0.369
0.084
0.787
0.162
0.794
0.630
0.000
0.016
0.434
0.763
0.436
0.151
0.973

*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*

Table 6 (Continued)
Panel B. Drop Earnings Surprise Variables
Independent Variables:

Audit
Risk

Audit
Complexity
Audit
Expertise
China
Variables
Corporate
Governance
Information
Demand
Earnings
Quality
Dependent
Variable:
Number of obs
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared

intercept
asset_return
loss
leverage
zscore
contingent_liability
opinion
audit_fee
Nsubsidiaries

Predicted
Sign
?
+
?
+
+
+
+

Coefficients P-value
3.438
-0.477
0.092
-0.046
0.002
0.021
0.116
0.053
0.001

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.055
0.569
0.108
0.000
0.000
0.024

auditor
change

+
+

0.023
0.052

0.351
0.001

Tshare
state_owned

?
?

0.014
0.010

0.645
0.320

concentration
independent
Nmeeting

?
-

-0.114
-0.107
-0.008

0.001
0.246
0.000

size

-

-0.002

0.704

exchange

?

0.039

0.085

restatement
regulatory_pressure

+
?

-0.017
(omitted)

0.257

Ln_audit_lag
5622
0.000
0.090
0.086
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*
*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*

Table 6 (Continued)
Panel C. Auditor Change (Alternative Definition)
Predicted
Independent Variables:
Sign
intercept
?
asset_return
loss
+
Audit
leverage
?
Risk
zscore
contingent_liability
+
opinion
+
audit_fee
+
Audit
Nsubsidiaries
+
Complexity

Audit
Expertise
China
Variables
Corporate
Governance
Earnings
Surprise
Information
Demand
Earnings
Quality
Dependent
Variable:
Number of obs
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared

auditor
change
Tshare
state_owned
concentration
independent
Nmeeting
good_news
surprise
size
exchange
restatement
regulatory_pressure
Ln_audit_lag
2826
0.000
0.092
0.082
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+
+
?
?
?
?
+
?

Coefficients P-value
3.895
-0.635
0.047
-0.100
0.000
0.041
0.155
0.046
0.001

0.000
0.000
0.152
0.081
0.953
0.034
0.001
0.007
0.005

0.025
0.049
-0.001
0.018
-0.017
-0.080
-0.009
-0.039
-0.008
0.004
0.026
-0.035
-1.459

0.456
0.043
0.978
0.230
0.737
0.562
0.000
0.007
0.750
0.664
0.445
0.118
0.000

*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
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Figure 1
Audit Reporting Lags in China
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